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Abstract 
Emerging research on Africa-China relations suggests that African actors only exercise 
agency when brokering relations with China and not in structuring and managing the 
engagement modalities. This view is limited and does not capture the complex and contested 
ways in which African actors influence their interactions with their Chinese counterparts. 
Applying an analytical framework of African agency in combination with a strategic relational 
approach, this article focuses on how Ethiopian state and non-state actors influence the 
engagement patterns in Adama 1 and Adama 2 wind energy infrastructure financing and 
development, before and during the negotiations, as well as during the implementation of the 
projects. Data was collected between April 2017 and January 2018 in Ethiopia in which one 
hundred and sixteen Ethiopian and Chinese actors participated in the interviews. Findings 
from this study reveal that Ethiopian actors’ exercise of agency is highly strategic and 
relational. This finding is important because it helps to contextualize African agency in Africa-
China relations in infrastructure financing and development and also provides novel and 
nuanced data to reject the presupposition that the Chinese trump Africans in their 
engagements. 
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Introduction  
In July 2009, the Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation signed an Engineering Procurement 
and Construction (EPC) and financing contract with the Chinese companies, HydroChina 
Corporation and CGC Overseas Construction Group (CGCOC) Joint Venture for the 
construction of Adama 1 wind farm. This unprecedented energy infrastructure project would 
generate a wind farm with a capacity of 51 megawatts (MW) in Ethiopia. Three years later, 
Ethiopia Electric Power (EEP) also signed another EPC plus financing contract with the 
HydroChina-CGCOC-JV for the development of Adama 2 wind energy infrastructure with a 
generation capacity of 153 MW. Construction of Adama 1 began in 2011 and was completed 
in 2012. For Adama 2, construction began in 2013 and was completed in 2015. At the 2015 
Forum on China-Africa Cooperation held in Johannesburg, the projects were used as 
examples of Africa-China cooperation in clean energy development. For HydroChina, CGCOC 
and the Chinese government, the wind farms are their most successful overseas projects, 
often referred to as the truest reflection of Chinese development assistance to Africa1.    
The two projects are, however, embedded in bifurcated narratives. On the one hand, China is 
seen as a good development partner, positively shaping Africa’s development trajectories 
through infrastructure, skills and technology transfer necessary for Africa’s economic and 
structural transformation2. On the other hand, some critics argue that China is part and parcel 
of the global configurations of capitalism and, as such, its engagement with Africa is “bad” as 
it extends neo-colonial tendencies to the detriment of Africa’s underdevelopment3. Although 
there is an element of truth in these dichotomous views, Africa is reduced to being “acted 
upon” and “impacted on” by the Chinese4. In both views, African actors are presented as less 
assertive and lacking capacity when engaging with China5.  
 
1 PowerChina. ‘Deputy Minister of Commerce said: Ethiopian wind farm is the pride of Chinese 
companies’, PowerChina, 23 June 2016, 
<http://www.powerchina.cn/art/2016/6/23/art_19_173781.html> (15 May 2018).  
2 See Deborah Brautigam, Tang Xiaoyang, Ying Xia, ‘What Kinds of Chinese “Geese” Are Flying to 
Africa? Evidence from Chinese Manufacturing Firms’, Journal of African Economies 27, 1 (2018), pp. 
29–51; David Dollar, ‘China’s Engagement with Africa: From Natural Resources to Human Resources’ 
(The John L. Thornton China Center at Brookings, N.W., Washington, D.C, 2016). 
3 Patrick Bond and Ana Garcia, ‘Introduction’, in Patrick Bond and Ana Garcia (eds), BRICS: An Anti-
Capitalist Critique (Pluto Press, London, 2015), pp. 1–14.  
4 Hanauer Larry and Lyle J. Morris, Chinese Engagement in Africa: Drivers, Reactions, and Implications 
for U.S. Policy (RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 2014). 
5 See Pádraig R. Carmody and Francis Y. Owusu, ‘Competing hegemons? Chinese versus American 
geo-economic strategies in Africa’, Political Geography 26,5(2007), pp.504-524; Folashadé Soulé-
Kohndou, ‘Bureaucratic agency and power asymmetry in Benin-China relations’, in Chris Alden and 
Daniel (eds), New Directions in Africa-China Studies (Routledge, Abingdon, 2019), pp. 189–204.  
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Research on African agency in the context of Africa-China engagements is scanty but 
increasing. For example, some studies have attempted to re-insert6, make space for7 and 
uncover8 African agency in Africa-China engagements. Others have argued that Africans have 
exercised agency when interacting with the Chinese, but only in brokering the engagement 
and not in changing the structural aspects of the relations9. These studies recognize that 
Africans are not passive actors in their engagements with China and they provide an essential 
departure point; however, they do not provide an adequate and disaggregated analysis of the 
engagement modalities and negotiation processes of the actors involved in these interactions. 
At the same time, far less research has been conducted on how state-society relations 
influence and shape the operationalization of African agency by African actors.  
This paper seeks to contribute to this body of literature on Africa-China engagements by 
contextualizing African agency and challenges a narrow and assumed interpretation of what 
African agency ought to be in Africa-China relations. By applying an analytical framework of 
African agency in combination with the strategic relational approach, this article explicitly 
“brings back” and “centers” African actors in Africa-China engagements and scholarly 
debates. Focusing on Ethiopian actors’ engagement with their Chinese counterparts in the 
two wind farms, this article brings a nuanced interpretation of agency seen through the lens of 
the Ethiopian state and non-state actor’s ability to strategically and relationally exert agency. 
It does so by providing a historical and empirical grounded analysis of the parameters in which 
Ethiopian actors influenced the engagement patterns, namely before and during the 
negotiations, and during the construction of the two wind farms.  
While speaking about “Africa agency” as if Africa is a homogenous entity may present 
analytical challenges10, however, in order to build a strong analytical argument, I will use the 
adjective “African” ‘with a full awareness that its usage constitutes a major generalization’11. 
Similarly, China cannot be treated as ‘monolithic, or “China Inc.,” in which everything works in 
 
6 Giles Mohan and Ben Lampert, ‘Negotiating China: Reinserting African agency into China–Africa 
relations’, African Affairs, 112, 446 (2013), pp. 92–110, p. 96. 
7 Ben Lampert and Giles Mohan, ‘Making space for African Agency in China-Africa Engagements: 
Ghanaian and Nigerian Patrons Shaping Chinese Enterprise’, in Aleksandra W. Gadzala (ed) Africa 
and China: How Africans and Their Government are Shaping Relations with China (Rowman and 
Littlefield, London, 2015), pp. 109-126. 
8 Lucy Corkin, ‘Uncovering African Agency: Angola's Management of China's Credit Lines’, (Ashgate 
Publishing Limited, Surrey, 2013). 
9 Peter Kragelund and Padraig Carmody, ‘Who Is in Charge? State Power and Agency in Sino-African 
Relations’ Cornell International Law Journal 49, 1 (2016), pp. 1-25; Jon Phillips, ‘Who’s in charge of 
Sino-African resource politics? Situating African state agency in Ghana’, African Affairs’, 118, 470 
(2019), pp. 101–124.  
10 Zegeye, A., & M. Vambe. 2006. “Knowledge Production and Publishing in Africa.” Development 
Southern Africa 23 (3): 333–349;  
11 Smith, Karen. “Has Africa Got Anything to Say? African Contributions to the Theoretical Development 
of International Relations.” Round Table 98, no. 402 (2009): 269–84, p.271 
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harmony12. China is a ‘collection of provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities with 
myriad strategic ties to African countries’13. Therefore, the use of “Africa/Africans” and  
“China/Chinese” emanates from the need to develop a representative analytical argument 
which later, will be disaggregated to go beyond ‘methodological nationalism, a tendency to 
see nation-states as the natural containers for social, political and economic processes in 
which there is congruence of social, political and economic borders’ 14. My reference to Africa 
and China here will relate specifically to those actors who were involved in the two wind farms 
discussed in this paper.  
Justifications for the application of African agency are two-fold. First, it helps to go ‘beyond the 
tired tropes of an Africa that is victimized, chaotic, violent and poor’15. These “tired tropes” 
have by and large peripheralized Africa and suggest that China is directing the pace and level 
of engagement. Such “tired tropes” emanate in part from mainstream media, academia and 
think tanks that presuppose Africa as a ‘pliant third world client of either West or (now) East’16. 
Second, the changing African economic potential and demographic dividend allow African 
socio-political and economic actors to claim their space in the global production of knowledge, 
circulation of capital and global configurations of power. This implicitly brings to the fore the 
actions, choices, manoeuvres, sacrifices and strategies undertaken by African actors—
thereby painting possibilities of an Africa able to carve out its space in tight corners.  
Applying a qualitative case study approach, this study draws from 116 interviews conducted 
in Ethiopia between April 2017 and January 2018 with participants from Ethiopian federal state 
institutions, Ethiopian government owned utilities and enterprises, regional states institutions 
in Oromia and Tigray, as well as farmers and community members where these wind farms 
are sited. Chinese participants were drawn from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
HydroChina-Ethiopia, CGCOC-Ethiopia and Goldwind-Ethiopia.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section one begins by providing an analysis of African 
agency in Africa-China relations arguing that the current state of literature does not provide 
an elaborative and adequate analysis of these unfolding phenomena, a theme some scholars 
 
12 Su, Xiaobo. “Rescaling the Chinese State and Regionalization in the Great Mekong Subregion.” 
Review of International Political Economy 19, no. 3 (2012): 501–27, p.504  
13 Shen, Gordon C., and Victoria Y. Fan. “China’s Provincial Diplomacy to Africa: Applications to Health 
Cooperation.” Contemporary Politics 20, no. 2 (2014): 182–208.  
14 Mohan, Giles, Ben Lampert, May Tan-Mullins, and Daphne Chang. Chinese Migrants and Africa’s 
Development: New Imperialists or Agents of Change? London: Zed Books, 2014, p. 10. 
15 William Brown and Sophie Harman, ‘African agency in international politics’, in William Brown and 
Sophie Harman (eds), African Agency in international politics (Routledge, Abingdon, 2013), pp. 1—18, 
p.2.  
16 Aleksandra W. Gadzala, ‘The Silliness of "China in Africa"’, The National Interest, 19 November 2013, 
< https://nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-silliness-china-africa-9422> (17 August 2019).  
4 
 
have so far begun to unravel17.  Next, I provide the analytical framework that guides this paper. 
Here, I argue that while the state has historical and strategic selectivity to organize and project 
power centers that offer unequal chances to different forces within and outside the state18, 
there is need to go beyond naturalization of the state as having agency, to more complex and 
interconnected analysis which is socially and relationally constituted within specific and 
substantive arenas. The third section describes how Ethiopian actors exercised agency when 
interacting with the Chinese in the financing and developing of the two wind farms. In 
conclusion, the paper re-affirms how Ethiopia-China engagement in the financing and 
development of Adama wind farms provides novel and nuanced data to reject the 
presupposition that the Chinese trump Africans in their engagements.    
 
Limits in the current framing of African Agency in Africa-China relations   
Research on African agency in the context of Africa-China engagements is scanty but 
increasing19. Meanwhile, African agency has been studied from two different but interrelated 
perspectives: non-state and state actors. In the case of the former, few but increasing studies 
shows that African actors beyond the state influence engagement patterns when interacting 
with the Chinese actors. For example, Lampert and Mohan’s ethnographic research in Nigeria 
and Ghana shows that Nigerian and Ghanaian traders exercise agency by using their social, 
political and patronage networks to shape their interactions with the Chinese in different 
businesses at various scales and times20.   
Some researchers also explore the role of state officials in conditioning the engagement 
patterns with Chinese actors. Soule-Kohndou examines the bureaucratic agency and power 
asymmetries in Benin-China infrastructure development21. She concludes civil servants and 
the executive arm of the state influenced Benin-China engagement patterns during and after 
contract negotiations. Although this study is helpful as it lays the foundation for conceptualizing 
 
17 See Aleksandra W. Gadzala, (ed) Africa and China: How Africans and Their Governments are 
Shaping Relations with China, (Rowman and Littlefield, London, 2015); Jon Phillips, ‘Who’s in charge 
of Sino-African resource politics? Situating African state agency in Ghana’, African Affairs’, 118, 470 
(2019), pp. 101–124; Soulé-Kohndou, ‘Bureaucratic agency and power asymmetry in Benin-China 
relations’; Peter Kragelund and Padraig Carmody, ‘Who Is in Charge? State Power and Agency in Sino-
African Relations’ Cornell International Law Journal 49, 1 (2016), pp. 1-25. 
18 Bob Jessop, ‘State power: A strategic-relational approach’. (Polity Press, Cambridge, 2007).  
19 See Aleksandra W. Gadzala, (ed) Africa and China: How Africans and Their Governments are 
Shaping Relations with China, (Rowman and Littlefield, London, 2015); Jon Phillips, ‘Who’s in charge 
of Sino-African resource politics? Situating African state agency in Ghana’, African Affairs’, 118, 470 
(2019), pp. 101–124; Soulé-Kohndou, ‘Bureaucratic agency and power asymmetry in Benin-China 
relations’; Peter Kragelund and Padraig Carmody, ‘Who Is in Charge? State Power and Agency in Sino-
African Relations’ Cornell International Law Journal 49, 1 (2016), pp. 1-25. 
20 Ben Lampert and Giles Mohan, ‘Making space for African Agency in China-Africa Engagements: 
Ghanaian and Nigerian Patrons Shaping Chinese Enterprise’. 
21 Soulé-Kohndou, ‘Bureaucratic agency and power asymmetry in Benin-China relations’ 
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African agency in this paper, it focuses only on the negotiation aspect paying little attention to 
brokering, implementation and management of the infrastructure deals, which this paper 
addresses.   
Explicitly aimed at understanding the nature and limits of the state agency, Phillips’ research 
questions how particular parts of the government of Ghana exercises agency in its bilateral 
and multilateral relations since oil discovery in 200722. He concludes that Ghanaian state 
actors have been able to exercise agency on aspects of brokering relations with the Chinese, 
Americans and traditional development banks, but not on transforming the structural basis of 
the engagements. In an edited volume, Gadzala23 explores how Africans are shaping their 
engagements with the Chinese. Of particular interest is Corkin’s contribution in the Angolan 
case study. She argues that Angolan elites uses an institutional enclave24, Futungo25 a group 
of ‘technocrats and advisors centred on the President’ created to specifically manage Chinese 
investment in Angola. Corkin’s conception of African agency in the Angolan case resonates 
well with Ethiopia’s engagement patterns with China under scrutiny in this paper. Just as 
alluded by Gadzala, the government of Ethiopia maintains a strong political influence in the 
domestic arena through the ruling EPRDF Council of Ministers26. The Council of Ministers is 
an elite group in charge of Ethiopia and controls every aspect whether foreign or domestic. 
This elite group ‘takes a strategic approach focusing on particular sectors, and cultivating 
relationships on multiple levels, from a focus on technical exchange and technology transfer 
to administrative and reform to political relations’27. Gadzala’s research in Ethiopia-China 
engagement shows that EPRDF used Chinese investments as mediums to maintain regime 
stability and political relevance.  
In the context of Ethiopia-China relations, studies that utilize an African agency dimension are 
scarce28. Yet, Ethiopia has been seen to be more active in conditioning its engagements with 
 
22 Phillips, ‘Who’s in charge of Sino-African resource politics? Situating African state agency in Ghana’ 
23 Aleksandra W. Gadzala, ‘Introduction’, in Aleksandra W. Gadzala (ed) Africa and China: How Africans 
and Their Government are Shaping Relations with China  
24 Lucy Corkin, ‘Understanding Angolan Agency: The Luanda-Beijing Face-Off’, in Aleksandra W. 
Gadzala (ed) Africa and China: How Africans and Their Government are Shaping Relations with China 
(Rowman and Littlefield, London, 2015), pp. 61–84. 
25 Marcus Power, ‘Angola 2025: The Future of the “World's Richest Poor Country” as seen through a 
Chinese rear-view mirror’, Antipode, 44, 3(2012), pp. 993-1014, p. 998.  
26 Aleksandra, W. Gadzala, ‘Ethiopia: Toward a Foreign-Funded ‘Revolutionary Democracy’, in 
Aleksandra W. Gadzala (ed) Africa and China: How Africans and Their Government are Shaping 
Relations with China (Rowman and Littlefield, London, 2015), pp. 85–106.  
27 Dawit Alemu and Ian Scoones, ‘Negotiating New Relationships: How the Ethiopian State is Involving 
China and Brazil in Agriculture and Rural Development’, Institute of Development Studies Bulletin 44, 
4 (2013), pp. 91–100, p.99.  
28 With exception of, see Miriam Driessen, Tales of Hope, Tastes of Bitterness: Chinese Road Builders 
in Ethiopia (2019, Hong Kong University Press, Hong Kong); Aleksandra, W. Gadzala, ‘Ethiopia: 
Toward a Foreign-Funded ‘Revolutionary Democracy’.  
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China29. To respond to such research gaps, I specifically examine how Ethiopian actors 
exercise agency in the financing and development of Adama wind energy infrastructure. While 
some researchers as explained above have looked at either non-state actors (like traders) or 
state actors (like officials) exercising of agency, we need to take a strategic relational view of 
these interactions.  The state is a negotiated entity where non-state actors shape and in turn 
are shaped by actions of the state. Exercise of agency is therefore interconnected as actors 
in different social locations exercise interconnect agencies. My research provides an 
empirically grounded analysis of the parameters in which Ethiopian actors influenced the 
engagement patterns, namely before and during the negotiations, and during the 
implementation of the two wind farms. 
I focus on Ethiopia for a variety of reasons. First, the country is the second largest recipient of 
Chinese finance and yet it has no substantive natural resources to explain Chinese interests30. 
Ethiopia also happens to be the first African country where Chinese enterprises have 
developed wind energy infrastructure, a sector not normally associated with Chinese 
engagements in Africa. A focus on these wind farms—clean energy helps us to make sense 
of what the Chinese are doing in Africa’s renewable energy sector which has so far received 
less academic attention31.   
Beyond these reasons, Ethiopia presents a particular and exceptional case study because it 
is presented as one of the few African countries able to meaningfully and strategically exercise 
agency when engaging with not only Chinese but any external actors. Ethiopia is not a 
“passive recipient” or a “pawn”32 in the wider power games33 and yet is a highly aid-dependent 
country. That said, ‘Ethiopia’s ties to China have until recently escaped much academic and 
mainstream literature’ and yet it has a ‘unique makeup [as] Chinese engagement in that 
country diverges from that in other [African] states’34. The preponderance of othering and 
(re)presenting Ethiopia as a unique case juxtaposed with other African countries justifies my 
selection of Ethiopia as a case study.   
 
29Deborah Brautigam, ‘Ethiopia's partnership with China’, 30 December 2011, 
<https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2011/dec/30/china-ethiopia-
business-opportunities> (17 August 2020).  
30 Wenjie Chen, David Dollar and Heiwai Tang, ‘Why is China investing in Africa? Evidence from the 
firm level’. The World Bank Economic Review, 32(3), (2018) pp. 610–632. 
31 Lucy Baker and Wei Shen , China’s involvement in South Africa’s wind and solar PV industries (2017, 
Number 15, China Africa Research Initiative, Washington D.C.) 
32 Dawit Alemu and Ian Scoones, ‘Negotiating New Relationships: How the Ethiopian State is Involving 
China and Brazil in Agriculture and Rural Development. Institute of Development Studies Bulletin, 44(4), 
(2013) pp. 91–100.  
33 Giles Mohan and Marcus Power, ‘New African Choices? The Politics of Chinese Engagement’. 
Review of African Political Economy, 35(115) (2008) pp. 23–42. 
34 Aleksandra, W. Gadzala, ‘Ethiopia: Toward a Foreign-Funded ‘Revolutionary Democracy’. p.85. 
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Framing African agency as an analytical framework  
Contemporary discussions about African agency in Africa-China relations have been framed 
from a vantage point of what Africans ought to do in order to exert influence when engaging 
with China.  This framing is limited in the sense that it projects a normative assumption of what 
has to be done, which in most cases is not reflection of reality. My framing of African agency 
as an analytical framework suggests that we need to consider African agency as strategic and 
relational. As such, engagements between Africa and China involve various African actors 
from various institutions whether formal or informal that play essential roles in structuring and 
influencing the engagement patterns and dynamics. These African actors are rooted and 
socially embedded in spatial and temporal socio-cultural contexts. Drawing from Brown’s35 
work on agency, and Jessop’s strategic relational approach36, the paper underscores that 
African agents (actors) whether as states, non-state actors, institutions, civil societies or 
individuals – are actors that have the ability or capacity whether collectively, individually or in 
various combinations, to strategically and relationally act consciously and sometimes 
subconsciously to achieve their intended objectives in constrained environments. Regardless 
of such structural constrains, these African actors are active respondents within their nested 
and overlapping socio-cultural, economic and political systems, and are equally able to hold 
their viewpoints simultaneously to others and have self-reflexive consciousness. This 
suggests a ‘complex dialectical interplay’37 where African agents ‘are neither simply free 
individuals, nor script-defined role performance, but both roles and subjectivity shaped in 
extent and content by, and operating within, a specific social context’38. 
Empirically, these African actors undertake social actions through collaboration, passivity and 
in some cases, resistance. I therefore consider African agency as not merely a normative 
attempt to understand the structure-agency relationship in the context of Africa-China 
engagements, but a more flexible and schematic framework to empirically investigate different 
interpretations made by African actors in their engagements with Chinese counterparts.    
In terms of African agency at the empirical level, Brown’s work proposes a four-dimensional 
understanding of African agency39. These are intergovernmental agency—a multilateral 
platform where Africans collectively voice, act towards a common goal, ambition or threat to 
African countries when engaging external powers; nation-state agency linked to the capacity 
 
35 William Brown, ‘A Question of Agency: Africa in international politics’, Third World Quarterly 33, 10 
(2012), pp. 1889-1908.  
36 Bob Jessop, ‘State power: A strategic-relational approach’. (Polity Press, Cambridge, 2007).  
37 Mirjam E. de Bruijn, Dijk, R.A.van, Jan-Bart Gewald, ‘Social and historical trajectories of agency in 
Africa’, in Mirjam E. de Bruijn, Dijk, R.A.van, Jan-Bart Gewald (eds), Strength Beyond Structure: Social 
and Historical Trajectories of Agency in Africa. African dynamics (Brill, Leiden, 2007), pp. 1-16, p. 10.  
38 Brown, ‘A Question of Agency: Africa in international politics’, pp. 1895 
39 Ibid 
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of the state to strategically and consciously exercise autonomy and independence in its 
engagement with external stakeholders; state-based actors’ agency that through the 
invocation of state’s regulatory and administrative systems undertake the implementation and 
operationalization of agreed declarations, memorandum of understandings; and non-state 
actors’ agency—individuals, groups, structure or organizations that lie outside formal state 
structures but yields political, economic and to some extent, social power. Whereas 
sovereignty matters for legitimacy purposes in international relations, non-state-agents 
interact with state and other non-state actors making them equally important in defining, 
conditioning and even mediating patterns, processes and modalities of engagement between 
Africa and China.  
Currently, a state centric analysis of African agency in the context of Africa-China engagement 
is dominant although it does not disaggregate the stakeholders who constrain and enable 
execution of agency who lie outside official state structures. Since the state is always a 
negotiated entity, porous state-society boundaries invariably shape and influence the 
execution of agency40. Jessop argues that the state is therefore a social relation in which social 
forces (actors) interact in pursuit of their respective immediate goals with efforts to alter the 
balance of forces and or transform the state and its basic strategic selectivities41.  
From a strategic perspective, actors selectively activate ‘past patterns of thought and action’ 
which over time gives them ‘stability and order […] to decode, predict and decide’ course of 
action42.  These actors are not only able to activate thought processes of the past but are 
equally futuristic in orientation in which social action and imagination are innovatively 
‘reconfigured to actors’ hopes, fears and desires’43. Such actors therefore can set for 
themselves development goals, visions or plans. Such goals, visions or plans are not however 
voluntary nor instrumental but are socially embedded in the temporal-relational context—
where conflict and cooperation are iteratively (re)negotiated between and among the social 
forces.  
It is crucial therefore that when examining African agency in the context of Africa-China 
relations, one needs to consider the context, the variations and the social forces operating 
within these spatio-temporalities. This takes me to the discussion of how state-society 
strategic selectivity factors influence the exercise of African agency in the context of Ethiopia-
China engagement in the financing and development of the Adama wind farms. To do so, it is 
 
40 Tobias Hagmann and Didier Péclard, ‘Negotiating Statehood: Dynamics of Power and Domination in 
Africa’. Development and Change, 41, 4 (2010), pp. 539-562.  
41 Bob Jessop, ‘State power: A strategic-relational approach’. (Polity Press, Cambridge, 2007). 
42 Emirbayer, Mustafa and Ann Mische, ‘What Is Agency?’, American Journal of Sociology 103, 4 
(1998), pp. 962-1023, p. 971. 
43 Ibid, p. 971.  
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imperative to examine Ethiopia’s complex and contested state-society relations after 1991 
when EPRDF came into power. Here, I trace the Ethiopian socio-political and economic 
development policy based on the authoritarian developmental state model adopted by Meles 
Zenawi’s government and how this model impacted on Ethiopia’s ability to exercise agency 
when dealing with China in infrastructure financing and development.    
 
Ethiopia’s complex state-society relations and contested development orientation 
To gain a broader understanding of Ethiopia’s state-society relations, it is always imperative 
to locate them in a historical continuum. Without being simplistic about Ethiopia’s history of 
state formation and organization, 1991 presents an interesting point of departure in the sense 
that an ethnic based federal state system was introduced composed of nine ethnic-based 
regional governments and two city-states44. The decentralised system by then was seen as a 
model for promoting self-development and self-governance in which access to ‘land, 
government jobs, representation in local and federal bodies was based on being ethnically 
indigenous in constituent ethnic state’45. TPLF-EPRDF saw ethnic federalism as a silver bullet 
to avert ethnic tensions as well as a tool for political, economic and socio-cultural mobilisation 
and state organisation.  
Essentially, TPLF-EPRDF became the vanguard party and saw itself as best placed to 
understand the ‘genuine’ needs and demands of the people. The party therefore became the 
state which in turn strategically and selectively created government institutions, ‘leaders, and 
vanguard elites who all spread and impose the party’s ideology, presented to both domestic 
and international audiences as democratic and revolutionary46’. When the Ethio-Eritrea war 
(1998-2000) broke out followed by the 2001 TPLF split47, and the 2005 elections48, civil and 
political liberties, and political space for opposition parties were curtailed, as the country 
degenerated into an authoritarian regime. This allowed Meles to centralise power, and equally 
create a new line of party elites and loyalists who subscribed to his ideological orientation of 
 
44 Tigray, Afar, Amhara, Oromia, Somali, Benishangul-Gumuz, Southern Nations, Gambela and Harari. 
A region was further divided into Zones, Woredas and Kebeles. The Woreda and Kebele were inherited 
from the Derg regime.  
45 Mahmood Mamdani, ‘The Trouble With Ethiopia’s Ethnic Federalism’, (2019 p.1, The New York 
Times). 
46 Jean-Nicolas Bach, ‘Abyotawi democracy: neither revolutionary nor democratic, a critical review of 
EPRDF’s conception of revolutionary democracy in post-1991 Ethiopia’, Journal of Eastern African 
Studies, 5(4), (2011, p. 648) pp. 641–663. 
47 The split between Tewolde-Siye group vs the Sebhat-Meles group.  
48 Elections were marked by violence and claims of vote fraud, arbitrary arrests of journalists, protestors 
and opposition leaders. 
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the need to build a capitalist society in order to build a class basis for development and 
democracy. 
Meles’ TPLF-EPRDF sense of the developmental state entailed the role of state to effectively 
monopolize political power and equally economic, through the creation of party endowment 
funds49. The Ethiopian state was therefore seen as havingembedded autonomy to 
independently formulate and implement policies against contending social and market forces.  
Learning from the Asian countries—in particular, Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, and later China 
(as I shall explain below), Meles’ emphasised the collective rather than the individual as a 
focal point of development. As a result, the ruling political elites capture the rents from the 
party affiliated endowments, businesses and state-owned enterprises and distribute them to 
themselves and their cronies50, and also to the national development priorities to stabilise their 
political power and maintain regime legitimacy. Justifications for this approach was that the 
state since had the necessary organisational power to consistently provide economic 
guidance through formulation and implementation of growth targeted macroeconomic 
planning and policies compared to the private sector. Several policy instruments were thus 
formulated and implemented including but not limited to the Agricultural Development Led 
Industrialisation, the Industrial Development Strategy, Plan for Accelerated and Sustainable 
Development to End Poverty and the Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP). Due to these 
various policy instruments, Ethiopia has recorded remarkable economic growth heights in the 
world with an average Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth of 10.5% over the past decades, 
reaching $80 billion in 201851. This growth was achieved by the Ethiopian government’s ability 
to court both Western and Eastern (in particular China) development finance. China was 
appealing because it offered practical lessons for the EPRDF to learn from without necessarily 
bending to the over-prescriptive powerful Western financial institutions and development 
agencies. 
In 2003, Ethiopia became the first African country to host the Forum on China-Africa 
Cooperation (FOCAC) and also in 2006 resulting in cementing of diplomatic and socio-political 
relations with China. China is now an important partner for Ethiopia’s economic structural 
transformation trajectories particularly as a source for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), 
 
49Tumsa; Wendo; Tiret; EFFORT. These business entities are linked with the constituent parties of the 
EPRDF and they derive considerable advantage to win government tenders because of their political 
connections.  
50 Berhanu Abegaz, ‘Political Parties in Business’, The College of William and Mary College of William 
and Mary Department of Economics Working Paper (2011, Number 113 April) 
//economics.wm.edu/wp/cwm_wp113.pdf 
51 World Bank, ‘The World Bank in Ethiopia’ (2018), retrieved from 
https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/ethiopia/overview.  
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infrastructure development finance and trade. From 2005 to 2018 estimates shows that 
Chinese investments and construction contracts in Ethiopia were $23.85 billion across all 
sectors52, while Chinese FDI in Ethiopia by 2016 was around $2 billion 53. What is evident is 
that China’s role in Ethiopia’s development trajectories is now indispensable and as the 
relationship continues to grow, questions of the Ethiopian government’s ability to strategically 
manage Chinese influence in its growth and transformation plan will emerge.  
 
Ethiopian state agency: the planning and strategic selectivity aspect   
Ethiopia’s successive administrations have always used infrastructure for poetic visualisations 
which inevitably shape how elites and ordinary citizens imagine the future of modernity—
collective fantasy of societal progress, connections and possibilities of a better future. Luque-
Ayala and Silver argues that ‘even today, modernity is measured by the extent to which 
populations have access to electricity, a fundamental way in which the politics of energy is 
constituted’54. The development of electricity infrastructures therefore ‘release different 
meanings and structure politics in various ways: through the aesthetic and the sensorial, 
desire and promise’55. With this visualisation and imagination comes the politicisation aspect, 
as infrastructure transmit and mediate representations about institutions (be they local or 
foreign) that built them and the spatiotemporal enclaves they create. The politicisation of 
infrastructure becomes a mobilisation tool to consolidate and legitimise regimes’ stay in power.  
Ethiopia like, the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa, has challenges with access to and development 
of electricity infrastructure. Yet electricity infrastructure is critical for addressing issues of 
industrial development, poverty eradication and structural economic transformation. According 
to the Ethiopian government’s Ministry of Water, Irrigation and Electricity (MOWIE), 44% of 
the 110 million Ethiopians have access to electricity in which 33% is from on-grid sources and 
11% from off-grid sources56. As of March 2017, only 6000 towns had access to electricity, and 
Ethiopia Electric Utility (EEU) had about 2.3 million customers57. Given the challenges of 
 
52 Chinese Global Investment Tracker Database, ‘Chinese Investments & Contracts in Ethiopia (2005 - 
2018)’, (2019, The American Enterprise Institute and The Heritage Foundation, Washington D.C.).  
53 According to UNCTAD World Investment Report (2017), by 2015, the USA had the largest FDI stock 
in Africa ($64bn) followed by the UK ($58bn), France ($54 billion), China ($35bn), South Africa ($22bn), 
Italy ($22bn) and India ($17bn).  
54 Andrés Luque-Ayala, Jonathan Silver, ‘Introduction’. In Andrés Luque-Ayala, Jonathan Silver (eds.), 
Energy, Power and Protest on the Urban Grid: Geographies of the Electric City (Routledge, Abingdon, 
2016, p.2). 
55 Brian Larkin, ‘The Politics and Poetics of Infrastructure’,  Annual Review of Anthropology,  42(2013, 
p.327), pp. 327-343.  
56 Government of Ethiopia, ‘Ministry of Water Irrigation and Electricity Power Sector Review’ (Federal 
Government of Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, 2017) 
57 Ibid 
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absence and shortage of electricity infrastructure, the Ethiopian government planned to 
develop wind farms as part of a wider solution to address electricity infrastructure gap. 
Development of non-hydropower renewables such as wind and solar did not receive much of 
government attention until in 2001 when the government participated in the United Nations 
Environment Programme and Global Environment Facility funded Solar and Wind Energy 
Resource Assessment (SWERA) project. Ethiopia’s participation in the SWERA led to the then 
government to develop interest in non-hydro renewables given the volatility of hydropower-
based generation. Findings from SWERA revealed that Ethiopia had a total of 100 gigawatts 
(GW) wind energy potential which translated to about 890 terawatt-hours (TWh) from an area 
of about 166 000km2 in which more than 20 000km2 was utilizable for grid-connected electricity 
generation58.  
After the completion of SWERA, the Ethiopian government invited the German Society for 
International Cooperation (GIZ) to conduct suitability studies for wind farms development in 
which 11 sites were identified as feasible. From these 11, feasibility studies were conducted 
for three sites; Harena, Ashegoda and Nazareth. The three sites had sufficient wind energy 
potential with annual averages of 6.86 m/s, 8.50 m/s and 9.36 m/s respectively59.   
Meanwhile, as part of the Ethiopian government strategy of selectively courting both Western 
and Eastern development partners, in 2010, HydroChina was commissioned to undertake a 
Wind and Solar Energy Master Plan for Ethiopia. The study found that Ethiopia was endowed 
with 3.03 TW wind resource reserve of which 1.35 TW was potentially installed. Fifty-one wind 
farm sites were proposed for development with a potential installed capacity of 6720 MW60.  
Upon the completion of the SWERA and HydroChina Master Plan reports, the Ethiopian 
government had access to accurate, verifiable and reliable data to support its ambitious 
development plans of solar and wind energy. In 2010, the Ethiopian government then 
proposed to develop eight wind farms during the GTP 161. The Ethiopia-China Development 
Cooperation Directorate in Ministry of Finance and Economic Cooperation (MOFEC) then 
approached the Chinese Export and Import Bank (C-EXIM Bank) for potential financing which 
 
58 Ethiopian Rural Energy Development and Promotion Centre, ‘Solar and Wind Energy Utilization and 
Project Development Scenarios’ (Government of Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, 2007). 
59 GTZ-TERNA, ‘Feasibility study for wind park development in Ethiopia and capacity building: 
Ashegoda wind park site final report’ (GTZ-TERNA, Addis Ababa, 2006).  
60 HydroChina Corporation, ‘Master Plan Report of Wind and Solar Energy in the Federal Democratic 
Republic of Ethiopia’ (HydroChina Corporation, Addis Ababa, 2012).  
61 Government of Ethiopia, ‘Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP) 2010/11-2014/15’ (Ministry of 
Finance and Economic Cooperation, Addis Ababa, 2010). 
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agreed after a series of negotiations62. This demonstrate agency by various parts of the 
government of Ethiopia.  
The planning and goal setting for the development of wind farms as part of the solution to 
address the shortage of electricity infrastructure in Ethiopia reflect demonstration of agency 
by the Ethiopian government63. Presently, the vision of the Ethiopian government is to achieve 
100% electrification by 2025. Although the data which was used to inform policy on the 
development of the wind farms was foreign-funded, the original ideas of developing wind farms 
were home-grown as depicted in the GTP. The Council of Ministers, which is exclusive to 
EPRDF initiated the development of these wind farms. While the Council of Ministers set the 
pace and direction, the design and actual implementation of the projects was decentralized to 
institutions which are constitutional and legally mandated to do so—MOWIE, MOFEC and 
Ethiopia Electric Power (EEP).  
 
Negotiating the financing terms and conditions of Adama wind farms  
Ethiopia, like most of the Global South, had torrid experiences with the Bretton Woods 
institutions in the late 1990s. As explained by one of the TPLF-EPRDF executive committee 
member:  
‘we had very difficult negotiations with the IMF and the WB. They were pushing us to 
privatize the power sector. We refused and had some challenges to accessing 
development finance needed to develop our country’s infrastructure’64.  
Chinese financing was chosen because the Chinese did not precondition their assistance with 
governance reforms. Meanwhile, the two wind farms were all financed under EPC plus 
financing arrangement in which a preferential export buyers’ credit was used for Adama 1 and 
a concessional loan for Adama 2. Data obtained from MOFEC participants interviewed reveals 
that the Ethiopian government exercised agency by specifically requesting for such financing 
facilities for a variety of reasons. First, the government of Ethiopia did not want an interest rate 
more than 3%. They also preferred a repayment period which was longer than what the market 
was offering then. Second, as part of the requirement from the Chinese side, the government 
of Ethiopia also agreed to award the contract without competitive bidding. Such a move as 
claimed by Ethiopian government official, ‘was out of strategic choice which comes from the 
country’s financial limitations and the huge demand for infrastructure development’65.   
 
62 Interview, Ethiopian government official MOWIE, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 11 October 2017.  
63 Mustafa and Mische, ‘What Is Agency?’ 
64 Interview, ex-Ethiopian ambassador to China, ex-member of the EPRDF-Executive Council, Mekelle, 
Ethiopia, 17 May 2017.  
65 Ibid. 
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The loan application process required the fulfilment of certain conditions (see Figure 1). A 
senior MOFEC official involved in the application process relays that, ‘we followed procedures; 
feasibility studies, ESIA, environmental license and preliminary agreement to award the 
contract to a Chinese contractor’ 66. The loan application was then supported by 
recommendation letters obtained from the Chinese Economic and Business Consulate and 
the Chinese Embassy in Addis Ababa. As noted by a Chinese enterprise involved in the 
project, the recommendation letters were significant because ‘if they did not give the support 
letter, it was going to be difficult to get the funding’67.  
MOFCOM then reviewed the applications resulting in the wind farms being accorded a high-
status profile. Immediately the applications were directed to C-EXIM Bank to structure the 
financial terms and conditions (see Table 1). Although MOFCOM agreed to finance the 
projects, it was the Chinese State Council that approved the applications (see Figure 1). Just 
as noted by a CGCOC employee: 
‘The projects were high status, and for Adama 1, MOFCOM officially approved the financing 
because the amount was smaller, but for Adama 2, the Chinese State Council approved 
because the amount was larger’ 68. 
Table 1: Financial details of Adama wind farms 
Descriptor Adama 1 Adama 2 
Capacity  51MW 153MW 
Unit power cost $2314/Kw $2254.9/Kw 
Interest incurred during construction $0.9945 million - 
Interest rate 2% 2% 
Project cost $117 million $345 million 
Source of financing 15% Ethiopia & 85% C-EXIM 15% Ethiopia & 85% C-EXIM 
Finance modality Preferential Export Buyer’s Credit  Governmental Concessional Loan 
Loan payment   13 years 13 years  
Grace period 7 years 7 years 
Loan maturity 20 years 20 years  
Total investment cost $117.9945 million  $345 million  
Source: Field data, 2017 
 
66 Interview, Ethiopia-China Development Cooperation Directorate at MOFEC, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 
30 June 2017.  
67 Interview, CGCOC, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 01 August 2017. 
68 Interview, CGCOC, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 01 August 2017.  
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When analyzing the official documents, I noticed that the total investment cost presented in 
the financial offer and the final agreed amount decreased from $123 million to $117 million for 
Adama 1 and from $528.85 million to $345 million for Adama 2. A MOFEC official claimed that 
reaching these price agreements was not easy. The difference in prices reflects agency of the 
Ethiopian government to carefully and strategically negotiate with the Chinese financial 
institutions for a low-cost financing69 of the projects. As alluded to by a former ambassador of 
Ethiopia to China 
‘when it comes to negotiations, we do proper project preparations. But the Chinese are not 
easy, they are very formidable negotiators, so you need to be as smart as them’70.  
While there is no substantial evidence to suggest that the price difference was a result of the 
Ethiopian government negotiating capacity, it could at least be interpreted as such. The deals 
were attractive as ‘they provided high repayment period of about 13 years, 7 years grace 
period, and 2% interest rate each’71. As argued by Kaplinsky and Morris, Chinese financed 
and developed large infrastructure projects are ‘20–30 per cent lower than those of Northern 
competitors’72. The 2% interest rate was way below the market rate which usually hovers 
around 5 to 10%.  
 
 
69 Interview, Ethiopia-China Development Cooperation Directorate at MOFEC, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 
30 June 2017.  
70 Interview, ex- Ethiopian ambassador to China, ex-member of the EPRDF-Executive Council, Mekelle, 
Ethiopia, 17 May 2017. 
71 Interview, Goldwind, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 20 January 2018.  
72 Raphael Kaplinsky and Mike Morris, ‘Chinese FDI in Sub-Saharan Africa: Engaging with Large 
Dragons’, European Journal of Development Research 21, 4 (2009), pp. 551–569, p. 561.  
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Figure 1: Adama wind farms loan application, approval and disbursement framework 
 
Negotiating the implementation and management of Adama wind farms   
Adama 1 and Adama 2 were delivered on an EPC plus financing contract. An EPC contract is 
the agreement reached between the client  and the contractor in which design, engineering, 
procurement, construction, commissioning and project handover responsibilities are shifted to 
the contractor to deliver the project within agreed cost, time and required performance level, 
in return for payment of a fixed price73.   
The Ethiopian government decided to go for the EPC contract as a risk aversion strategy74. 
Risks associated with EPC project delivery mechanism include completion risk within agreed 
price, timescale and quality. Mega-infrastructure projects involve many sub-contractors 
undertaking different components of the project and because of several sub-contractors (see 
Table 2), a potential clash ‘arises where a plant contains one party’s proprietary technology 
but is otherwise delivered by another contractor’75. The EPC contractual terms and conditions 
for both Adama 1 and 2 show that HydroChina-CGCOC-JV as the contractor was obliged to 
undertake the design, manufacturing, supplying, construction, installation, testing and 
commissioning of all electrical and mechanical equipment of the two wind farms. 
Table 2: Adama wind farms implementation entities  
Wind farm Owner Contractor  Consultant Main sub-contractors  
Adama 1 EEP HydroChina-CGCOC-JV AAUIT Goldwind turbines 
 
73 FIDIC, Conditions of Contract for EPC/Turnkey Projects 1st Edition (FIDIC, Geneva, 1999).  
74 Interview, ex-Adama 2 project consultant team, Adama, Ethiopia, 17 November 2017. 
75 Jonathan Hosie, ‘Turnkey contracting under the FIDIC Silver Book: What do owners want? What do 
they get?’, November 2007, < https://fidic.org/sites/default/files/hosie06.pdf> (16 May 2018), p. 3.  
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SinoTrans 
SANY Crawler Cranes 
Adama 2 EEP HydroChina-CGCOC-JV MU-ASTU-JV SANY Crawler Cranes 
SinoTrans 
SANY turbines  
ESLSE 
Source: Field data, 2017 
 
As stated in the Particular Conditions of Agreement the Ethiopian government is the owner of 
the projects. Ownership came with the ability to shape the terms and conditions of the 
agreement as shown by excerpts for Adama 2 below: 
‘The contract shall be governed by and constructed in accordance with the Laws of the Federal 
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. Notwithstanding the transfer of ownership of Plant and 
Materials. Unskilled labour required by the Contractor for the Work shall be recruited locally 
directly by the Contractor’76.  
The Particular Conditions of Agreement further stipulated that 30 EEPCo engineers were to 
be trained in the case of Adama 2 (see Appendix 1). Additionally, Ethiopian engineers and 
technicians were to inspect factory manufacturing of the wind turbine generators (WTGs) and 
associated equipment, towers of WTGs, two main transformers, circuit breaker, and 
disconnector and other electrical equipment (see Appendix 2). 
Field data shows that the EEP exercised agency by having an Operations and Maintenance 
(O&M) contracts separate from the EPC contracts for Adama 1 and Adama 2 wind farms. For 
Adama 1, CGCOC did not participate in the O&M contract. Instead EEP signed the O&M 
contractor with Goldwind, the technology supplier. As highlighted by officials from EEP that 
‘Adama 1 agreement was 20 months for operation and maintenance with Goldwind’77. For 
Adama 2, officials from EEP also claim there is also a O&M contract separate from the EPC 
contract. ‘The Chinese will stay only for two years during operations and maintenance. After 
two years, EEP will take full control of the wind farms’78. What this shows that, for the Ethiopian 
government, it made sense to have an O&M contract with the technology suppliers than with 
EPC contractors as this would allow fostering of cooperation between EEP and the technology 
suppliers than the EPC contractors.  
 
76 Government of Ethiopia, ‘Appendices to Particular Conditions of Contract for Adama 2’ (Government 
of Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, 2012); Government of Ethiopia, ‘Particular Conditions of the Contract for 
Adama 2’ (Government of Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, 2012).  
77 Interview, Adama 1 project manager, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 14 July 2017.  
78 Interview, Adama 2 wind farm project management team, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 23 June 2017.  
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On local procurement and subcontracting, the contract stated that the ‘contractor was to hire 
local sub-contractors as much as possible’79. According to one official who was part of the 
project consultancy team for Adama 2:  
‘There was a provision in the contract that Ethiopian based companies were supposed to 
participate in Adama 2. But the majority of our Grade A contractors refused to the Chinese 
offers because they were too cheap’80.  
Mugher cement was used for turbines foundation and other civil works. Some of the steel was 
sourced locally and some from China. The majority of machinery and equipment for 
construction purposes were sourced locally, with a small proportion imported from China. 
Goldwind manufactured and supplied the turbines and other equipment for Adama 1. SANY 
Group manufactured and supplied the turbines for Adama 2. SANY Group further supplied a 
SANY SCC4000 crawler crane and two 80-tonne truck cranes used for lifting the turbines. 
Sinotrans was involved in the ground transportation of the turbines from Djibouti port to project 
sites while ESLSE was responsible for sea transportation of Adama 2 equipment from China 
to Djibouti port. For Adama 1 both sea and inland transportation was handled by Sinotrans. 
However, in the case of Adama 2, Ethiopian government rejected the Chinese proposal for 
using Sinotrans. Instead the contract was given to ESLSE at $74 per freight tonne81.  
Another vital condition to highlight here is that all the project consultancy work was contracted 
to local universities: Addis Ababa University Institute of Technology (AAUIT) for Adama 1 and 
Mekelle University (MU)-Adama Science and Technology University (ASTU)-Joint Venture 
(JV) for Adama 2. The local universities’ roles as project consultants were to supervise the 
construction of the projects, by administering the contract between EEP and HydroChina-
CGCOC-JV and performing commissioning testing of the wind farms. The Ethiopian 
government saw the use of local universities as a way of transferring skills and technical 
knowledge to Ethiopians. AAUIT was selected in the case of Adama 1 as a consultant because 
it was by then the only institution that had successfully researched design review of wind 
turbines in the country82. MU-ASTU-JV was selected for Adama 2 because of MU previous 
experience with the Ashegoda wind farm and also as part of the Ethiopian government 
strategy ‘to improve local university linkage’83. 
 
79Government of Ethiopia, ‘Particular Conditions of the Contract for Adama 2’ (Government of Ethiopia, 
Addis Ababa, 2012) p. xx  
80 Interview, project consultancy team, Mekelle, Ethiopia, 11 August 2017.  
81 Interview, Far East trade route division, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 27 October 2017.  
82 Interview, Adama 1 project consultancy team, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 26 June 2017 
83 Interview, project consultancy team, Mekelle, Ethiopia, 11 August 2017. 
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To efficiently coordinate the implementation of the two wind farms, the Ethiopian government 
set up project management institutions that directly engaged the Chinese counterparts. As 
such, EEP and the consultants (AAUIT; MU-ASTU-JV) set up project management offices.  
Labour dynamics is also one of the parameters to explore how African actors exercise African 
agency. Field data shows that the Ethiopian government exercised agency on employment 
dynamics on the two projects.  For Adama 1, 1100 were employed out of which 800 were 
Ethiopians, and 300 were Chinese. For Adama 2, 1480 workers were hired out of which 1200 
were Ethiopians, and 280 were expatriates (see Figure 2). The contractor in liaison with EEP 
hired all local employees, and all unskilled employees were from the Adama locality, and most 
were Oromos. For unskilled workers, the salary range was from Ethiopian Birr 600 ($34.6) to 
1000 ($57.73) per month84. This was in addition to the food and shelter provided by Chinese 
enterprises. If we could factor in these other costs, the total salary figure goes up. 
However, management and related technical positions were dominated by Chinese citing the 
absence of local skills and capacity. In the Adama wind farms, EEP and MOWIE officials who 
participated in this study agree that they have limited technical and management skills to 
occupy such positions.  
 
Figure 2: Employment statistics for Adama 1 and 2   
The data obtained from the field shows that the Ethiopian government exercised agency by 
controlling the amount of Chinese and foreign workers involved in the two wind farms.  
Through the enforcement of existing Labour Proclamation, foreign (including Chinese) work 
permit were for three years and is annually renewed at the subjective discretion of the Ministry 
of Labour85. Just as noted by an EIC official, ‘where we Chinese workers violating this, it was 
 
84 Using December 2011 exchange rate of ETB 17.3204/$1 
85 Government of Ethiopia, ‘Labour Proclamation Number 377/2003’ (Federal Negarit Gazeta of 
Government of Ethiopia, 2004).  
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simple, we will not renew permits for the Chinese86. While the use of the Labour Proclamation 
to regulate foreign workers explains the Ethiopian government’s agency, it should also be 
noted that it is also becoming increasingly expensive for Chinese enterprises to hire 
foreigners. At the same time, due to international pressure and media scrutiny levelled against 
the Chinese, more locals are being hired to water-down the allegations87.   
The Ethiopian government also exercised agency on skills, knowledge and technology 
transfer. Skills and technology transfer are not inherently a technical issue which is left to 
technical fixes; it is undoubtedly political88. However, because of the EPC nature of the 
contracts for Adama wind farms, the technology was imported as finished capital goods from 
China, leaving no or limited room for an Ethiopian wind energy industry to emerge. In addition, 
the Ethiopian government allowed the importation of finished capital goods from China 
because Ethiopia did not have a domestic wind energy sector with capabilities to design and 
engineer wind energy technology. As such, a high-level MOWIE official confirmed that ‘all the 
local input was pretty limited to civil works that are to access roads, foundation and supply of 
some materials like steel and cement’89. Therefore, the transfer of technology created limited 
local supply chain linkages and opportunities for local value chain development in the wind 
energy sector90.  
Technical skills and knowledge were transferred from the Chinese contractors to the local 
engineers and technicians who were involved in the construction process. For Adama 1, 
twenty-five and Adama 2, thirty (23 technicians and 7 engineers) EEP employees received 
theoretical training on wind turbine generation system in China for one month and onsite 
training during the construction period. Besides the skills and knowledge transfer experienced 
by EEP engineers, the three local universities which were consultants benefited in the two 
projects. ASTU and AAUIT students regularly visit wind farms to undertake practical lessons 
and are now used as “open” laboratories. The professors who were consultants had no 
previous experience but are now able to undertake design review and supervise the 
construction of wind farms. Finally, Ethiopian Shipping and Logistics Services Enterprise 
(ESLSE), which transported the wind technology equipment from China to Djibouti, is now 
able to handle bulk and fragile cargo91. With all the necessary technical skills, knowledge and 
 
86 Interview, Ethiopia Investment Commission, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 13 June 2017. 
87 Carlos Oya, ‘Labour regimes and workplace encounters between China and Africa’ (IDCEA Working 
Paper 05, SOAS, 2018).  
88 Oliver Hensengerth, ‘South-South technology transfer: Who benefits? A case study of the Chinese-
built Bui dam in Ghana’, Energy Policy 114 (2018), pp. 499–507. 
89 Interview, Ethiopian government official MOWIE, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 11 October 2017. 
90 Yanning Chen, ‘Comparing North-South technology transfer and South-South technology transfer: 
The technology transfer impact of Ethiopian Wind Farms’, Energy Policy, 116(2018), pp. 1–9. 
91 Interview, Far East trade route division Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 27 October 2017. 
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technology transfer, EEP and MOWIE are now able to undertake wind farm planning, civil 
works, assembly of the turbines, connecting to national grid and monitoring performance, and 
undertaking operations and maintenance. Next, I turn to discussion of agency at the margins 
of the state.  
 
Resistance as agency at the margins of the state 
Access to land for the development of the two wind farms was considered one of the most 
challenging processes by Ethiopian government officials. Just as noted by EPRDF executive 
committee member that ‘nobody want to give you land. You have to make them understand 
that this is good for them; it will alleviate them from poverty’92. Although land belongs to the 
federal state, the regional states are the custodians and land for any infrastructure project 
must be approved and allocated by them. This legislative framework has created an 
ambiguous land tenure system at least from the perspective of the farmers ‘regarding the 
authority of state and non-state actors’ and equally for broader land administration aspects93.  
Meanwhile, decisions to do with land allocation for infrastructure development are left to the 
Council of Ministers which is exclusively composed of EPRDF Council (the Council is 
composed of 36 members: 9 representatives from each of the 4 coalition parties). As per the 
federal government principle of democratic centralism, decisions reached by the EPRDF 
council are binding on the Congress and members of the coalition. Land allocation for the 
development of the two wind farms was decided upon at the Council level, passed on to the 
Oromia regional state. Oromo Peoples' Democratic Organization (OPDO) now Oromo 
Democratic Party the ruling party from Oromia regional government is therefore bound by the 
EPRDF Council agreement as part of the ruling coalition. In turn, the regional government will 
extend the same directive to the zonal administration, then to the District (Woreda) and finally 
to the Ward (Kebele) level. 
This reveals a top-down exercise of agency where decision making processes on land 
acquisition for infrastructure projects in Ethiopia is controlled by the ruling elites. Farmers are 
at the bottom of the decision-making hierarchy. This contributes to a discrepancy between 
what government officials at the top and farmers at the bottom of the hierarchy consider as 
citizen engagement in the development process. In this case, farmers are seen merely as 
recipients of development but do not have a say on the what, how, why, when, and which 
 
92 Interview, ex- Ethiopian ambassador to China, ex-member of the EPRDF-Executive Council, Mekelle, 
Ethiopia, 17 May 2017. 
93 Tom Lavers, ‘Responding to land-based conflict in Ethiopia: The land rights of Ethnic minorities under 
federalism’, African Affairs, 117(468) (2018, p.462 pp. 462–484.  
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ideas of the development intervention. This shows that Ethiopian non-state actors have limited 
space to exercise agency because of the government’s tight control on the planning and 
project execution process. This comes from the authoritarian approach to development 
adopted by the Ethiopian government.   
Land for both Adama 1 and Adama 2 was acquired from Oromia regional government. The 
process was not smooth as some government officials would want to claim. For example, 
official narratives from the government suggest that ‘there were no problems recorded during 
the construction period’94. While Ethiopian government officials provide a narrative that 
glorifies the process, many farmers and even some of the officials from the government 
countered the ‘official’ narrative. As noted by one EEP official:   
‘We had big challenges with regards to obtaining land from the farmers. They blocked 
construction process. It even delayed the project schedule. There were three groups of farmers. 
Some accepted to leave their farmlands and give it to us before the government released the 
compensation. But some refused and said we would release the farms once the government 
had paid us the money. And some blocked access roads to the construction sites, some even 
stole construction materials’95. 
The excerpt shows that the farmers did not trust the government on aspects of compensation. 
Several farmers lamented the compensation process ‘was not sufficient and did not reflect the 
market dynamics’96. Another farmer also argues that, ‘the compensation was inadequate. I 
took the issue to the Kebele administration, I was not successful’97.  
Although the farmers whose land was taken were compensated, the majority were not happy 
with the compensation rate, and they were not powerful enough to resist or reject the 
government move. This signifies government-facilitated accumulation by dispossession, 
defined by Harvey as ‘temporal displacement through investment in long-term capital projects 
[…], spatial displacements through […] new production capacities and new resource’98. This 
results in peasant farmers being displaced from their land and suppression of their rights in 
the name of development, creating new forms of domination, subordination and equally 
resistance by the dispossessed and displaced. Disruption of construction activities by farmers 
as well as stealing of the construction materials of the two wind farms as portrayed in the 
 
94 Interview, Adama 2 plant management, Adama, 15 November 2017.  
95 Interview, Adama 1 Project management, Addis Ababa, 14 July 2017.  
96 Interview, farmer in Adama Woreda, 02 November 2017.  
97 Interview, farmer in Qachema Kebele, 01 November 2011. 
98 David Harvey, ‘The ‘new’ imperialism: accumulation by dispossession’, Socialist Register 40 (2004 
p.64), pp. 63–87.  
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excerpt above should, therefore, be interpreted as a demonstration of resistance by the 
weak99.   
Since the government facilitated this accumulation by dispossession information obtained 
from the farmers suggests that they were not properly and adequately consulted. As such 
public consultation process was done only to tick the boxes and not fully engage with the 
affected communities before the commencement of the construction of the wind farms. This 
raises important questions on the citizen engagement in development matters. Ethiopia’s 
developmental state model closed the gap for citizen engagement in matters of national 
development. An important reading of this is that people at the margins of the state are not 
anti-development or do not want infrastructure but are not comfortable in the way development 
interventions are delivered. The act of resistance by the farmers, later forced the Ethiopian 
government to release the compensation which resulted in some construction equipment 
being recovered100.  
 
Towards a contextualization of African agency   
The Ethiopian case study presented in this paper raises significant questions about how one 
should conceptualize African agency in Africa-China engagements. The schematic hybrid 
analytical position developed in this paper is that although various actors exercise agency, 
there is need to return the focus to the state, but at the same time break down the components 
which constitute it101 and factoring in semi-state, non-state, individuals, transnational actors, 
market factors (transnational and domestic capital), society, institutions as important variables 
conditioning African agency in Africa-China engagements102.  
Several conclusions are drawn here. The first is that various parts of the Ethiopian government 
were able to influence policy formulation and translation in the development of wind energy. 
As highlighted in the GTPs the Ethiopian government set the priorities for these projects, which 
demonstrates ‘ownership and degree of control’103. I demonstrated how the government was 
proactive in having embedded autonomy over policy formulation and translation. Second, it 
was the Ethiopian government’s initiative to develop the two wind farms. The Ethiopian 
government brokered the deals and did not end there. Several institutions were used to deal 
with the Chinese including but not limited to the management fixes and institutional enclave, 
 
99 James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday forms of peasant resistance (Yale University Press, 
Yale, 1985). 
100 Interview, CGCOC, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 01 August 2017. 
101 Joel S. Migdal, State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One 
Another (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001). 
102Mohan and Ben Lampert, ‘Negotiating China: Reinserting African agency into China–Africa relations’.   
103 Alastair Fraser and Lindsay Whitfield, ‘The Politics of Aid: African Strategies for Dealing with Donors’ 
(The Global Economic Governance Programme Working Paper Series (No. 42, Oxford, 2008), p. 3.  
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such as EEP, MOWIE and MOFEC. Furthermore, three project management offices, one for 
EEP, one for consultants and one for the contractors were created. These “institutional fixes” 
created enclaves that are somehow accountable to the political elites. 
Third, the Ethiopian government was able to influence the terms and conditions of the deals, 
including the choice for using EPC plus financing arrangement. The government knew that it 
could not deliver the projects because of financial, skills and capacity limitations. At the same 
time, to avoid donor commitment uncertainties and regulatory compliance challenges, the 
Ethiopian government used the same contractors and the same financier on the two projects. 
In addition, the Ethiopian government chose to go for a concessional instead of a commercial 
loan agreement. This cushions the country’s debt status. In fact, Ethiopia’s debts are ‘mainly 
in the form of project loans, largely concessional at below-market rates with a roughly 30% 
grant element’104. This could be interpreted as a predetermined move by the Ethiopian 
government. This shows how “smart” the Ethiopian government is to avoid deterioration into 
debt distress and the so-called debt-trap.  
Furthermore, the consultancy contracts for the two projects were awarded to local universities, 
which had no experience at all in managing such mega projects. Importantly, the government 
created short operations and maintenance contracts, which were separate from the EPC 
contracts. The operations and maintenance period for the contractor in both cases were limited 
to allow local engineers and technicians to learn on the job, and then take over once the 
contractor had left. 
Finally, at the very bottom layer of the interactions, farmers demonstrated agency when 
dealing with the Ethiopian government and the Chinese. The obstruction of the construction 
activities and stealing of some of the construction materials was innovatively used as a way 
of making the Ethiopian government to timeously release the compensation105. Such acts of 
defiance and resistance do not nonetheless occur only to Chinese backed large projects, but 
to all projects which threatens the community’s livelihoods, be it in Ethiopia or elsewhere106.  
 
Conclusion  
Ethiopia-China engagement in the financing and development of Adama wind farms provides 
novel and nuanced data to reject the presupposition that the Chinese trumps Africans in their 
engagements. My research illustrates that different but interrelated generalizations could be 
 
104 IMF, 'The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Staff Report for the 2017 Article IV Consultation-
Debt Sustainability Analysis' (IMF, Addis Ababa, 2017), p. 4-5.  
105 James C. Scott, ‘Weapons of the Weak: Everyday forms of peasant resistance’. 
106 A recent example is the protests in Lamu Kenya against the Chinese backed coal power plants. 
See https://qz.com/africa/1301469/photos-kenya-environmentalists-protest-china-coal-plant-in-lamu/  
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made about African agency in the context of Africa-China engagements. First, the system of 
governance, socio-economic and political make-up matters for the exercise of African agency. 
The Ethiopian case study reveals that the government’s authoritarian developmental state 
system especially under the premiership of Meles Zenawi allowed the government institutions 
and political elites to exercise political and bureaucratic agency. The continued stay in power 
by the then ruling coalition EPRDF and ‘absence of powerful elite factions outside the ruling 
coalition’107 allowed EPRDF led government to ‘lock in’ development policy and vision, as well 
as stability for bureaucratic and institutional practice continuity. Linked to this is that, an African 
country’s location and role in African geopolitics matters for geopolitical and geo-economic 
calculations by foreign powers. Ethiopia as a regional powerhouse has often been used as a 
launch-pad for Chinese engagements in Africa. This results in Ethiopian actors defining and 
influencing their interactions with the Chinese explicitly based on their knowledge of what the 
Chinese want and can deliver. The third issue is that non-state actors increasingly have a role 
to play in infrastructure planning and development. As Chinese capital in Africa enters already 
existing social life-worlds be it at the individual, community level, regional state level, it is not 
immune to the conditioning effects of state-society relations. As the relations continue to grow 
between Africa and China, there is therefore need to recognize the interconnectedness nature 
of African agency.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
107 Tom Lavers, ‘Social Protection in an aspiring ‘developmental state: The political drivers of 
community-based health insurance in Ethiopia’, (ESID Working Paper No 71. Manchester, 2016), p. 23.  
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Appendix 1: Training proposal by EEP to the contractor for Adama 2 
Item  Time/period Number of people  Description  
Submission 
of proposal  
Within 28 days after 
commencement 
date 
 The Contractor shall come with the 
time, detail schedule and course 
content for the training within 28 
days after commencement date for 
the Employer’s review. The review 
period shall not exceed 28 days  
The first 
stage training 
in China  
Within 90 days after 
the commencement 
date, lasting 42 days  
10 person from 
EEP 
5 tutors from 
HydroChina-
CGCOC-JV and 
equipment 
manufacturers  
General theoretical training—14 
days; Wind park site 
investigation—11 days; Wind 
turbine Generator (WTG), Tower 
and transformer factory visit—14 
days 
The second 
stage training 
in China  
Within 150 day after 
the commencement 
date, lasting 42 days  
10 person from 
EEP 
5 tutors from 
HydroChina-
CGCOC-JV and 
equipment 
manufacturers 
WTG manufactory practice—14 
days; Tower manufactory 
practice—14 days; and WTG 
transportation and installation 
theories—11 days 
 
Training at 
site  
56 days  10 person from 
EEP 
10 tutors from 
HydroChina-
CGCOC-JV and 
equipment 
manufacturers 
Erection training –7 days; test 7 
Commissioning training—14 days; 
operation training—21 days and 
Maintenance training 14 days. 
Supervisor  One supervisor for each group will be assigned to follow the progress of training 
and report the status to the Ethiopian government higher management 
Source: Particular Conditions of Agreement  
Appendix 2: Factory inspection proposal for Adama 2 
Item  Time/ period  Number 
of person  
Description  
WTG and associated 
equipment   
Within 56 days after 
commencement date, 
lasting 15 days  
4 Factory inspection and 
testing before ex-work for the 
first batch of WTGs 
Tower of WTG  Within 56 days after 
commencement date, 
lasting 15 days  
2 Factory inspection and 
testing before ex-work for the 
first batch of towers 
2 Main transformers  Within 56 days after 
commencement date, 
lasting 15 days  
2 Factor inspection and testing 
before ex-work for the main 
power transformers 
Circuit breaker, 
disconnector and other 
electrical equipment 
Within 56 days after 
commencement date, 
lasting 15 days  
2 Factory inspection and 
testing before ex-work for the 
first batch of unit 
transformers 
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WTG and associated 
equipment 
Within 120 days after 
commencement date 
lasting 15 days 
4 Factory inspection and 
testing before ex-work for the 
second batch of WTGs 
Tower of WTG Within 120 days after 
commencement date 
lasting 15 days 
2 Factory inspection and 
testing before ex-work for the 
second batch of WTGs 
Source: Particular Conditions of Agreement 
 
 
 
 
 
  
